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Epistemology of Belief: Blameworthiness, Credibility and Virtues of Epistemological Agent
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Epistemology of Belief: Blameworthiness, Credibility and Virtues of Epistemological Agent
Annotation
PII
S1811-833X0000616-7-
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Alina Kostina 
Edition
Volume 57 Issue 2
Pages
231-237
Abstract
The following article discovers current trends of contemporary epistemology, related to epistemological subject and his/her activities. A number of issues raised here describe internal experience of the agent, such as (in)voluntary nature of belief formation, trust in one’s faculties of perception, correspondence of formed beliefs to evidence, demarcation between purely epistemological and pragmatic rationality. Another part of the issues is related to external experiences of the agent. The most crucial among them are: blameworthiness of the agent’s belief system, limited intake of testimonial knowledge as a result of social bias; epistemic disagreement and “epistemic peers” as the sources of knowledge or additional pressure from the environment. Virtue epistemology as a new way of performing epistemological normativity.
Keywords
epistemology, epistemological agent, normativity, virtue epistemology, Zagzebski, Greco, Sosa
Date of publication
01.06.2020
Number of purchasers
22
Views
488
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
Previous versions
S1811-833X0000616-7-1 Дата внесения правок в статью - 31.10.2020
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References



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  6. Fricker, M. “Testimonial Injustice”, in: Fantl, J., McGrath, M., Sosa, E. (eds.). Contemporary Epistemology. NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2019, pp. 149‒163.
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  7. Ganson, D., “Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief”, in: Fantl, J., McGrath, M., Sosa, E. (eds.). Contemporary Epistemology. NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2019, pp. 77‒90.
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