

AU-HYBRID PEACEKEEPING MISSION: BUILDING PRODUCTIVE PARTNERSHIPS

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In a report provided by Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID)¹ in 2016, there have been over 12 million refugees and internally displaced persons from conflicts in Africa. Hundreds and thousands of people have been slaughtered from a number of conflicts and civil wars. Over the years there have been series of conflicts, both intrastate conflicts (Algeria, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Western Sahara, and the Republic of Congo) and interstate (Chad/Libya)².

The development of African peace operations was informed by the weaknesses of UN responses in Africa, which were visible in cases such as Rwanda in 1994, when the UN hopelessly failed to maintain peace and prevent genocide. These institutional and system-wide failures spurred African-led initiatives to deliver security. They have led to deeper institutional cooperation among the AU and regional economic communities³. The most prominent recent examples are the United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)⁴, African Union Mission in Burundi, African Union Mission to Somalia, African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA)⁵.

It is however the intent of this paper to not just analyze the cooperation, it therefore suggests a better and additional regional cooperation with Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and others in ensuring a better and effective Peacekeeping operation in Africa.

According to Diego Salama in his United Nations University (Maastricht University) publication and Danielle Renwick of the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S., a hybrid mission is a joint effort where a regional organization - in this case, the African Union (AU) - shares the political, financial, logistical and military burdens with the UN, CSTO or other major strong organization⁶. In hybrid missions the partners are theoretically equals and align their agendas to achieve the mandate. There is a single political representative and a single military commander.

The AU, created by the Constitutive Act of 2000⁷, is equipped with more meaningful institutions, carries a stronger mandate, and has a more appropriate framework to intervene in armed conflicts than its predecessor (OAU). Indeed, the formation of the AU has resulted in major shifts in African policy, away from norms of nonintervention to an activist view of collective responsibility⁸. And the UN Security Council authorizes peace operations by an affirmative vote of nine of the fifteen members without a veto from the five permanent members: the United States, China, France, Russia, the UK.

The bodies dedicated to peace and security have been placed under the framework known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Within APSA, a fifteen-member Peace and Security Council, which can approve armed intervention in cases of gross human rights violations and unconstitutional changes in government, provides one of the AU's most ambitious initiatives. Additionally, the APSA consists of a peace-building framework that includes a «Panel of the Wise» to promote mediation efforts; a rapid-reaction African Standby Force anchored in five regional brigades; a Military Staff Committee; a Peace Fund; and a Continental Early Warning System⁹.

More than one hundred thousand uniformed peacekeepers were deployed in Africa in early 2015, twice as many as a decade before. Peacekeepers have been deployed to Somalia, the western Sudanese region of Darfur, South Sudan, and Mali, to name a few countries where civil wars and rebellions have claimed civilian lives and threatened to destabilize surrounding regions.

COMPARATIVE MANDATE: AU, UN, CSTO

Peacekeepers in Africa are tasked with increasingly broad mandates, including civilian protection, counter terror, and counterinsurgency operations, and operations increasingly depend on partnerships between the United Nations and African Union. Peace operations can be important

for maintaining stability and safeguarding democratic transitions.

The AU's security architecture highlights Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (specifically Article 52), which encourages regional organizations to cooperate with the UN and recognize the preeminent role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. In this vein, the 2007 UN-AU Ten-Year Capacity Building Program and the 2010 UN-AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security both attempt to align AU initiatives with UN mandates.

Danielle Renwick¹⁰ in his work on Peace Operations in Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations pointed out, that, "the UN deploys peacekeeping forces to prevent or contain fighting; stabilizes postconflict zones; helps implement peace accords; and assists democratic transitions".

The UN generally follows three principles for deploying peacekeepers:

- Main parties to the conflict must consent;
- Peacekeepers should remain impartial but not neutral; and
- Peacekeepers cannot use force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

"Contemporary mandates have often blurred the lines separating peacekeeping, stabilization, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, atrocity prevention, and state-building," George Washington University's Paul D. Williams¹¹ writes in a CFR report.

AU PEACEKEEPING MANDATES

The African Union, a fifty-five country group that comprises all African states except for Morocco, establishes peace support operations when authorized by its Peace and Security Council (PSC), a fifteen-member body with no permanent members.

Since the AU's Peace and Security Council was established in 2004, it has sent or authorized over sixty-four thousand uniformed peacekeepers (troops and police) to missions on the continent. This includes authorizing two multinational task forces to fight against the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa and Boko Haram in Nigeria and surrounding countries.

The AU and several African regional organizations are developing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), a set of institutions that is expected to house the African Standby Force, a permanent reserve of more than twenty thousand peacekeepers. The APSA was supposed to be fully ready by the end of 2015, although experts doubted that it would attain full operational capabilities. The AU engages in activities similar to the UN, although there is no requirement that its forces remain

impartial, and they may be called in where no peace accord has been signed. AU missions may be launched against the wishes of the country in conflict under "grave circumstances," namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity¹².

COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an intergovernmental military alliance that was established on 15 May 1992 by six post-Soviet states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States, i.e. Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia, signed on the next year and the treaty took effect in 1994. In 2002 they agreed to create the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a military alliance. Uzbekistan joined the CSTO in 2006 but withdrew in 2012.

Deputy Secretary General Valery Semerikov in a statement during the opening ceremony of the CSTO collective peacekeeping forces exercise "Unbreakable Brotherhood" on the 23 August 2016 said that Assets of the Collective Security Treaty Organization will be involved in peacekeeping missions of the United Nations Organization. Asserting the renewed position of the organization, the CSTO Deputy Secretary General stressed that "for the first time ever the CSTO collective peacekeeping forces will get a mandate of the UN Security Council and will operate in a crisis area together with the UN mission"¹³.

According to the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, the Russian troops are peacekeepers of the Collective Security Treaty. It is intended, above all, to participate in peacekeeping operations in the territories of the CSTO member states (under the decision of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO), as well as outside of these states (on the basis of mandates from the UN Security Council)¹⁴.

The mandates of CSTO in collaboration with the mandate of the UN and AU in marriage will achieve a measurable peacekeeping objective needed in Africa with its adoption of a better "hybrid" mission with these organization.

BUILDING PRODUCTIVE PARTNERSHIPS

The UN-AU-CSTO and others Joint Task Force on Peace and Security is a valuable forum that can contribute to further AU-Hybrid cooperation and mission. The UN should assist this process with cooperation with AU and other Organizations by standardizing its training of peacekeepers and offering guidance from the UN Department for

Peacekeeping Operations to the AU. Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari, a Senior Research Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs, in his article "on the AU and Security", asserted that the bilateral collaborations, such as the one between the AU/Economic Community of West African States and France in the January 2013 intervention in Mali, prove to be effective¹⁵. An attempt to work on a better and effective collaboration with CSTO would create an effective security architecture and dynamic peace building and peacekeeping process on the African continent.

Member states should embrace bilateral initiatives, including those of EU member states, such as the French RECAMP program, which provides peacekeeping training and military assistance. This will be more effective in the region where France maintains a high level of influence, as it (France) would not want a destabilization that would eventually affect its investment and citizens in the region. Or the UK's British Peace Support Teams, which provide peacekeeping training and democratic management instruction in African states, which ultimately would be effective in the regions where they possess a better level of influence. Same with the U.S. African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program. ACOTA provides nonlethal peacekeeping training and nonlethal equipment to African countries on a bilateral basis.

It's imperative to note that engaging the CSTO

will create a better balance structure to effective AU-Hybrid peacekeeping mission on the continent.

However, over the past years, the ambitious dream of a comprehensive security architecture of the AU has been taking shape at a remarkable pace and the organization has become deeply involved in the continent's manifold security problems by building on the experiences and relying on the resources of the regional organizations.

In Burundi, for example, the African Union Mission (AMIB) stabilized the fragile situation and prepared the ground for a subsequent UN peacekeeping operation. In Darfur, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has, despite severe financial and logistical difficulties, done remarkably well in alleviating widespread suffering and containing a conflict in which no one else seems prepared to intervene. While all of these examples testify to the AU's dedicated efforts to develop a continental capacity for peace operations, the most telling indicator of the AU's commitment is its rapid progress in establishing the African Standby Force (ASF)¹⁶.

But, the AU has to take a new dimension and approach by engaging other main or regional organization to achieve the desirable last longed peace on the African continent. CSTO is an organization that can additionally bring a dynamic system and collaboration of effective AU-Hybrid peacekeeping mission to the continent hungry for peacekeeping and effective peace-building.

¹ Global Report on Internal Displacement // GRID, p. 29 - <http://www.internal-displacement.org/globalreport2016/pdf/2016-global-report-internal-displacement-IDMC.pdf>

² Report from Institute for Security Studies. Peacekeeping successes and failures in Africa. April 29, 2009 - <http://reliefweb.int/report/angola/peacekeeping-successes-and-failures-africa>

³ Hengari A.T. The African Union and Security. Council of Councils. July 26, 2013 - http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p32415

⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769. Adopted by the Security Council at its 5727th meeting, on 31 July 2007 - [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769\(2007\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769(2007))

⁵ Central African Republic: Security Council approves new peacekeeping force. UN News Centre - <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46667>

⁶ Salama D. Is Hybrid Peacekeeping a Model of Success? The Case of UNAMID. United Nations University, Maastricht University. April 18, 2016 - <http://www.merit.unu.edu/is-hybrid-peacekeeping-a-model-of-success-the-case-of-unamid/>; Renwick D. Peace Operations in Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. May 15, 2015 - <http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/peace-operations-africa/p9333>

⁷ Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) - http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf

⁸ Hengari A.T. Op. cit.

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Renwick D. Op. cit.

¹¹ Williams P.D. Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa. Council Special Report No. 73. May 2015, p. 8.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ CSTO peacekeepers to partake in UN missions Society. 23.08.2016 - <http://eng.belta.by/society/view/csto-peacekeepers-to-partake-in-un-missions-93751-2016/>

¹⁴ Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Russia's participation in peacekeeping operations. 2016 - http://eng.mil.ru/en/mission/peacekeeping_operations.htm

¹⁵ Hengari A.T. Op. cit.

¹⁶ Report from Institute for Security Studies...